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Consumer Debt · Statute of Limitations

Statute of Limitations on Debt in Georgia

How long a creditor or debt collector has to sue you over a debt in Georgia, by debt type — and, just as important, when that clock can restart.

Draft entry: figures pending statute verificationStatute §9-3-24; §9-3-25Source legis.ga.gov
Debt statute of limitations · Georgia
6 years
is how long a creditor or collector generally has to sue over credit-card debt in Georgia. After that, the debt is usually "time-barred."
Credit-card debt6 years
Written contract6 years
Oral contract4 years
Open account4 years
Promissory note6 years
Statute§9-3-24; §9-3-25

The four limits at a glance

Years a lawsuit is allowed, by debt type. Credit card is the most-searched.

Credit card
6 years
Written contract (long side)
Written contract
6 years
Oral contract
4 years
Promissory note
6 years

Six years — the long side. Even without a signature, Georgia treats a cardholder agreement as a written contract accepted by use. Hill v. American Express (289 Ga. App. 576, 2008) placed credit cards under §9-3-24 (6 years, written), not §9-3-25 (4 years, open account). Many consumer sources wrongly use 4 years.

When the clock starts — and what can restart it

The single most misunderstood part of debt limitations.

When the clock starts
The clock runs from when the debt became "due and payable" — generally default or the last payment.
Only a signed writing revives it

A new promise to pay a barred debt must be in writing to revive it (O.C.G.A. §9-3-110/§9-3-112). A partial payment may act as revival under case law, but the safe rule is that only a signed written promise clearly restarts the clock.

A statute of limitations does not erase the debt or wipe it from your credit report — it is a defense you must raise if you are sued after the period runs. In many states a partial payment or a signed written acknowledgment can restart the clock, so be careful before paying or signing anything on an old account. This page is legal information, not legal advice.

The full limits, with the statute

Every period and how Georgia classifies each debt type.

Debt typeLimit in GeorgiaHow it's classified
Credit card6 yearsWritten contract (long side)
Written contract6 years
Oral contract4 years
Open account4 years
Promissory note6 years

Promissory-note periods often come from the UCC (§3-118, generally 6 years) rather than the general contract statute; confirm the instrument type for a specific note.

What Georgia debtors get wrong

Georgia surprises people by putting credit cards on the long 6-year written-contract clock, not the 4-year open-account one. The key case is Hill v. American Express (2008): even without a signature, a cardholder agreement is a written contract accepted by use, so it falls under §9-3-24 (6 years) rather than §9-3-25 (4 years). Plenty of consumer sites still quote 4 years for Georgia cards — that's the trap. To revive a barred Georgia debt, a creditor generally needs a new promise in writing.

Common questions

What is the statute of limitations on credit-card debt in Georgia?

Six years. Under Hill v. American Express, Georgia treats a cardholder agreement as a written contract (§9-3-24), so the 6-year period applies rather than the 4-year open-account period.

Isn't Georgia credit-card debt 4 years?

That's a common error. The 4-year period (§9-3-25) covers open accounts and oral contracts. Georgia case law places credit cards in the 6-year written-contract category.

Can a partial payment restart a barred debt in Georgia?

To revive a debt that is already barred, Georgia generally requires a new promise in writing (§9-3-110/§9-3-112). A partial payment may count under case law, but a signed written promise is the clear trigger — so be cautious either way.

When does the Georgia debt clock start?

When the debt became due and payable — generally at default or your last payment. The 6-year credit-card period runs from there.

Primary source
O.C.G.A. §9-3-24; §9-3-25
Georgia General Assembly (O.C.G.A.) · legis.ga.gov
Draft: pending editorial review
The official O.C.G.A. host renders as a script app with no server-rendered text (403 to automated agents); §9-3-24/§9-3-25 and Hill v. American Express were confirmed via Justia and FindLaw case law, but a human must open the official code in a browser before this page can carry a verified byline. Editorial standards →

Not legal advicePlainStatute provides plain-language summaries of public law for general information only. This is not legal advice. Statutes change; always confirm current requirements with the official source linked above before acting.